Bihar defeat is Modi's defeat

Had drafted this note in longhand on the 9th of November. Lethargy had stopped me from posting it for 8 weeks. Though dated, still posting it so that it at least appears in the timeline of 2015.

Claiming ‘I-told-you-so’ post occurance of an event carries high credibility risks, particularly when there is like evidence of one actually having said so. For this reason and this alone, and even after discounting the lusty cheerleading going on till around 11 AM on October 8, words of many pundits, who now claim to have had foretold BJP’s debacle, are flummoxing.

Did not the Modi brigade claim an overwhelming mandate for development all along? Did it not claim that Modi’s INR 1,75,000 Crores package was a deal-sealer, that Modi’s personal appeal was transcending caste/class barriers and that people are voting for Modi in droves or that Modi’s attack on possibility of reservations for minorities had stymied the desertions of backward classes and had re-rallied support for the BJP?

Just what did happen in a mere hour that the cheerleading got replaced with a list of sage reasons, ranging from the lazy intellect of Biharis to weird conspiracy theories. All sort of reasons but scarcely any blame getting attributed to the Modi-Shah duo or any the BJP’s lackluster governance. It was quite striking when you consider that only an hour earlier, paeans were being sung to them for their vision, sagacity and efforts. Now, if credit was to be given for good show, how can the same people not be blamed for a bad show? Just how different from Congress is this ‘party with a difference’. There too, all victories are by the ‘Grace of Gandhis’ and all defeats ‘collective responsibility’?

This intermittent blogger, to all those who had cared to ask, had all along maintained that there was no way the BJP would win in Bihar, and that too for the most simple and obvious of reasons.

Modi triumphed in 2014, buoyed by a ‘wave’. Then, the general public voted for an icon, an idea that would deliver them from the hopelessness all around and guide them to a better future. Seventeen months in power is a long enough time for people to form impressions whether their hopes are being fulfilled. If they are not, people may still cling on hope, but definitely will not rally around the hope-giver like they had done previously. And even otherwise, Modi wave was a catharsis of frustrations, blood and tears of many. Our most successful politician ever, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi knew that public emotions cannot be aroused again and again. Hence, he kept a lag of a decade in between each of his major mass movements, from the non-cooperation to the Civil disobedience to Quit India.

Can we rationally expect people to come out and vote in droves for a messiah who may be false? Can people really be expected to vote for someone who seems disconnected with the masses, disowns electoral promises, talks haughtily and most critically, under whose rule, the humble onion, dal and mustard oil became food for the not-so-humble?

To all those who claim that the outcome of even 2014 would have been different had Nitish-Lalu allied in those elections, I beg to differ. History shows that individual vote shares of 2 parties do not translate into an absolute total when win alliance. Most candidates being their own loyal votes too, the core vote of the party could be lesser than the increments provided by the candidates. A case in point would be Maharashtra where the combined vote shares of NCP-Congress when they had contested separately was over 50%. If elections were sum of core vote shares, there would not have been any point in strategising, in conducting strenous campaigns. Outsiders like AAP would never have made an impact anywhere. So the claim that the BJP was at a huge disadvantage needs to be dismissed. To say that backward castes polarised is disingneious. Major chunks of even Brahmins and Rajputs have voted for Mahagathbandhan. Moreovr, polarization carries an inherent risk of counter-polarisation. Given the Modi wave in 2014, there is little to suspect that even a Nitish-Lalu combine could have worsted NDA in Bihar.

Many Modi apologists keep on claiming that 17 months is too small a period to undo 60 years of mess.

Was India really a complete mess in these last 60 years? No, it wasn’t! And does it really take 5 years to make a difference to the lives of people? Again, no – it doesn’t!

A case in point – only a few months in the NDA’s first regime in Bihar, there was a perceptible improvement in law and order. The first few months of UPA saw such momentous (some may say disasterous) actions in terms of NREGA, RTI and so on. Each spell of Mayawati’s rule in UP invariably sees an improvement in general administration. Modi’s own 1^st stint in Gujarat saw a dramatic improvement in the relief and rehabilitation measures being taken for the earthquake survivors. Kayan Singh’s 17 month old Government, even when pre-occupied with the Ram temple liberation movement, gave the best governance UP had had in years.

Just how long is incrementalism or planted stories on Modi’s work ethics going to sway the gullible masses? If we believe that Modi’s promises led people to vote for him, how can we reject the hypothesis that his u-turns on those promises disillusioned at least some of his voters, who if not voting for his opponents, did not vote for him this time? That if people rallied to vote for him driven by his promise to get black money stashed abroad back to India, would at least some of them, not reacted with disgust when the party president called those promises mere jumla?

In isolation, neither Modi’s taste for rich dressing, his insipid governance, his u-turns would have been strong enough to prompt people not to vote for the BJP. But together, they certainly take away the sheen off the self-proclaimed deliverer and show him to be just another politician, a glib talker, a jumla master, an alliterating demagogue, but at the end of the day, just another self-serving politician, in service to the suited-booted of the world.

Now, if the voter had to choose between just another politician and his own caste brethren, why would he overlook his caste loyalties? On the other hand, if he had felt that the great leader was actually working to change his (the voter’s) life for the better, he would have cared little for caste or the contrived controversy over Mohan Bhagwat’s comments (which I maintain, going against conventional wisdom, was factual and had nothing objectionable in it)

On governance, just how credible an attack on Nitish for his mis-governance when the BJP was very much a part of his government for 8 years? Personally, I had relied on the average Bihari’s appreciation of Nitish’s efforts in delivering them from jungle raj to bless him with their votes. They did. I dare say that Nitish could have fought alone and still managed a comfortable number of seats to gain support from Congress and RJD to form a government with less dependence on Lalu for survival.

Ever since the impact of Nitish’s governance had been manifest on ground, the NDA had hardly lost any election in Bihar, be it the general elections or bypolls. Hence, to claim that the Bihari does not reward good governance is plain lazy blame-shifting,

Finally, the Lalu factor. The media loves to write off people. It loves to deify people. Then it loves to write them off again only to deify at a later date. It is simply because extreme tales grab eyeballs much more than plaid staid facts. Even in the worst of times, Lalu commanded some 20% vote share in Bihar. Any commander of 1 in 5 voters in the state is a formidable force, particularly in the 1^st-past-the-post electoral system of India. That the RJD came back from the dead is a story only for those who confuse sensationalism with news. RJD was never dead. It simply prospered again in the right conditions.

If anything, the story of RJD’s rejuvenation should provide a jolt to those Modi-worshippers who had actually started believing in fanciful tales of a Congress-mukt Bharat.

In its worst ever performance, the Congress has managed to win over 18% of votes. A few right alliances, a few more failures of Modi, a little more of people shedding their hopes and it won’t be long before the Congress, aided by dispirited Modi supporters staying at home, wins a vote share of 23%-25%, sufficient enough for them to form Government once again.

Some optimistic right-wingers believe that Modi/BJP will learn their lessons from this defeat. Lessons they will surely learn, but all the wrong ones!

Rather than focusing on making people’s lives better, the trio of Modi-Shah-Jaitely is likely to focus on keeping the ‘fringe’ in control. That the BJP’s performance post ‘cow-polarisation’ in Seemanchal was comparatively much better than in rest of Bihar would be lost.

We know what happened in 2004. Then, the arch-secular BJP was routed and it took 10 years of UPA misrule for it to make a comeback. Let’s make no mistakes; Modi would not have become the phenomenon that he became had the UPA under Rahul Gandhi not been his alternate.

Today, if elections are conducted, inspite of all the disillusionment, Modi may still emerge as the leader of choice, though by a much reduced majority. The same Bihar which has voted for Nitish-Lalu now may still vote for Modi as PM. All this for 2 reasons. There are still vestiges of hope. People do not want to lose hope till they can. And even more importantly, there is no credible alternative to Modi on the horizon right now.

Yet, it will take only a few more mis-steps and a sustained campaign by a re-branded Rahul or a Priyanka or even a Nitish, to ensure that Modi and the BJP get confined to history in 2019. The diiference with 2004 would be that this time, the exile would be much longer. While Modi could not deliver a Congresss-mukt Bharat, the next rulers would definitely ensure a BJP-RSS mukt Bharat in their rule.

Take a stand Uddhav

But for the recent pre-election intrigues at Maharashtra, the BJP had over the years, perfected the art of being ‘ditched’ by its so-called allies. So strong was BJP’s sense of self-flagellation that multiple kicks by Mayawati in UP, Mamata in Bengal and Jayalalitha in Tamil Nadu only heightened the urge of its leaders to be once again held in embrace by these parties, even when fully knowing the fate that would follow such alliances. Before Nitish, guided by the delusion of ruling India in 2014 itself, pulled out from the NDA, the BJP had begged, groveled, crawled, swallowed all indignities, parted with Lok Sabha seats, Rajya Sabha berths, in short, continued to act like a traditional Indian wife in an abusive marriage before the inevitable happened. Yet, all those snubs fall short of the divorce masterstroke played by Naveen Patnaik just before 2009 elections. While the BJP continued to press for its original share of seats, Naveen kept up the charade of bargaining to increase his seat share, as in his words – the BJD had gained strength owing to which ground realities had changed’, before pulling out of the alliance just days before the elections. To say that the BJP was nettled would be an understatement. Smug in its belief that the BJD would need its support in the post-election scenario, the BJP unleashed a vituperative campaign, even alleging Naveen’s involvement in the barbaric assassination of Swami Laxmananand Saraswati the year earlier, with some leaders even proclaiming in public rallies that the soul of departed saint would ensure that 2009 is Naveen’s Waterloo.

Well, the electorate thought otherwise. Naveen won a large majority single handedly and the BJP was reduced to single digits in the assembly, a situation which has only marginally improved even 5 years later. So clinically successful was Naveen’s severance in 2009 that even now the secularists celebrate it while the BJP continues to nurse a deep grudge against Naveen and even Pyari Mohan Mahapatro, the then architect of that divorce.

Given its experiences, it was quite ironical to see the BJP adopting Naveen’s book while shrugging off Shiv Sena as an inconvenient partner. The similar claims of higher seat share, the same sham of negotiations, the same last minute desertion, similar poaching of candidates from other parties, wholesale intake of office bearers across constituencies where the BJP’s presence was weak, (though not on a scale as big as Naveen). What was additional was confabulations with the enemy – Sharad Pawar, who seems to end up holding some or the other aces in all elections. It will be foolhardy to dismiss the likelihood that BJP dumped the Sena only after Pawar assured that it would do the same with Congress. Just notice how both the alliances came apart within hours of each other and even post election, NCP barely took time to declare its support to the BJP. Further, it is difficult to visualise that people as canny as Amit Shah and Narendra Modi would have run the risk of running a solo campaign against a Congress-NCP alliance, which even in its most discredited state, together command a vote share higher than that BJP.

Anyway, like Orissa 2009, Maharashtra 2014 too proved that people are hardly bothered with esoteric ideas like ‘betrayal’. So, even though it did not win an outright majority, it won enough to prove that it had indeed become decisively bigger than its erstwhile partner.

The similarities stop here. Unlike the BJP in Orissa, Sena was not decimated in Maharashtra. Not only did it protect most of its strongholds, it gained vote-share and seats to emerge as the second largest entity in Maharashtra. Further, while it is difficult to visualise Naveen seeking Congress support (and Congress reciprocating) had he fallen short, the BJP had no qualms in visibly embracing support of a party which large segments of Maharashtrians see as epitome of corruption and misrule. Add to that the reaction of BJP supporters. Those very people who had nothing but the choicest abuses for Naveen see no wrong in similar acts getting committed against its oldest ally. Lastly, while the angry BJP reconciled itself to an opposition role in Orissa, the Shiv Sena, is acting like the BJP would, when Maya, Mamata and Jaya were concerned. Probably it has something to do with the Hindu Nationalistic DNA of both the parties that make them act thus. Yet, the cringe-inducing behaviour of Sena has only succeeded in lowering its prestige in the eyes of the world.

While there are many reasons why Balasaheb and his bunch of Sainiks came to occupy a special place in the hearts of Maharashtrians, one aspect which defined Balasaheb, and by extension, the Sena, was his bravado backed by stubborn adherence to stands once taken, howsoever, politically incorrect they would be. Sena under Balasaheb was akin that neighbourhood toughie, who even with all his vices, is loved because the toughie is a man of his word, of conviction, is available on call and protects the neighbourhood in his own not-so-civil ways. Today, even though Uddhav has managed to score a victory of sorts, having held on to his forts and decisively reclaiming his father’s legacy from his usurper cousin, he is a much diminished leader. He is seen at most like a Maratha sardar of the olden days, who would swallow every indignity to curry some favours from the Delhi Sultanate. Why should people be blamed if they think so – is not the party of late Balasaheb reduced to a pathetic state of begging for invitations to oath taking ceremonies, of beseeching all influencers to gain a foothold in the state government, of any number of inconsequential ministries? This is a party where while at one time, Chhagan Bhujbal, the strongest strongman Sena has known, had to go virtually underground to escape Sainik’s wrath for deserting the party. Today, a political featherweight like Suresh Prabhu can join the central ministry, ostensibly on the Sena’s quota, without as much as a hello, thank you, from Uddhav!

Just what prevented Uddhav from pulling out of the NDA when the BJP so unceremoniously dumped it? What is it that keeps Uddhav hoping that the BJP would finally agree to take him in? Even if it does, will it be worth the immense harm it has already inflicted and will further inflict on the Sena’s image? Just what does it want? Play the role of an effective opposition or continue with its pusillanimity, hoping for crumbs from the BJP?

Let’s not think even for a moment that having tasted power on its own strength, the BJP would ever be willing to sup with Sena as even equal partners ever. They don’t need to. People have spoken. Yet, since both the Sena and the BJP tap a common voter-base for support, the BJP will try its level best to further shrink Sena, if possible to the point of oblivion or at least, to an inconsequential rump. Currently, the BJP holds the maximum number of MLAs from Mumbai, the heart of Sena. Why would the BJP agree to contest the coming civic elections as a junior partner of Sena? And if they fight even as equal partners, it would be a de jure acceptance of Sena of its diminished role in Maharashtra. As an opposition, the Sena stands a stronger chance of withstanding BJP’s onslaught. Not only will it be immune from the charges of commission and omission which will stick to it even if it supports the BJP from outside, it has potential to occupy more of the opposition space ceded by a receding Congress and those sections of the population which have a strong affinity to Hindutva related politics.

It is a sad commentary on the partisan nature of our politics that forget core BJP supporters, even traditional opponents of the BJP have found nothing objectionable in the NCP-BJP live-in. The BJP has every reason to thank NCP. Had it not been for its corruption, the public mood against the State Government may not have been that strong. Had it not been for Pawar’s assurances, the BJP might not have been able to cut Sena to size. But for its brazen support to its Government, the BJP would still have had to make amends with Shiv Sena. But, an alliance with Pawar, howsoever covert it might be, only damages the BJP’s sheen. An indulgent public may turn the blind eye today. Tomorrow, nothing stops them from declaring it as dyed in corruption as the ‘Naturally Corrupt Party.

Moving from Maharashtra, even though the BJP dumped Kuldeep Bishnoi’s Haryana Janhit Party too, the two dumping instances (Sena and HJC) are very different from each other. While agreements need to be honoured, they are entered into with an underlying assumption of the partner’s strenght. HJC even though bouyed by the Modi wave, miserably failed to display any strength in the Lok Sabha polls, with Bishnoi too losing his seat. Add to that HJC’s flirting with other parties (including Congress) tenuous connect with the NDA and a proclivity to run an independent campaign, BJP can be little faulted in parting ways from a vacuous, unreliable ally. The Sena’s case is different. Not only was the alliance old, it was based on a clear understanding of role of the larger party getting swapped in assembly and parliamentary elections. Even more, the Sena performed credibly well in the Lok Sabha elections too, proving that it was a worthy partner as far as electoral stakes were concerned.

Anyway, all analysis are passe. Uddhav has to decide – whether to uphold the Sena legacy and continue a tough, solitary struggle or get reduced to a political cipher in its thirst for immediate fruits of office.