Showing posts with label Rajiv Gandhi. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Rajiv Gandhi. Show all posts

Saturday, October 3, 2015

Indian mis-adventure in Nepal


Indians have a short memory. We have forgotten that before the Green Revolution made us self-sufficient, we led a ‘ship-to-mouth’ existence, surviving on low-cost wheat from the US under PL480 and red wheat fit for cattle from Australia.

It is worth remembering that the wheat under PL480 was low-cost and not free. Yet, given that the reins of power lay with the US, it held those shipments under tight leash, withholding shipment to punish us now and then, say for criticizing its adventures in the Vietnam. Of course the Indian people were outraged and demanded an end to this humiliation. To her credit, Mrs. Indira Gandhi realising that the well-off would survive while the poor, with little idea of the politics behind the grain, could starve, continued with the aid-trade till results of the Green Revolution started coming in.

One would imagine that a Nation which has suffered slavery for over a 1000 years and was reliant (and still is) on goodwill of other countries for many of its basic requirements, would be sensitive to the plight of those other Nations which are poorer than it or in any way, dependent on it. Yet, in classic bully behavior, while India seems to bend over backwards to accommodate powerful neighbours or those who will never be its friend, it wants to play the colonial overlord to its weaker neighbours. Ever since their birth, both Pakistan and Bangladesh have been recipient of India’s benevolence, with the relationship with Bangladesh particularly being a one-way gift street from India. On the other hand, tiny Nepal, a civilizational brother has had to face India’s overwhelming pressure on an ongoing basis.

Imagine a situation where the US or any other Nation tries to dictate India’s constitution to India. Even if flaws in Indian constitution would be as large as a Black Hole, no self-respecting Indian would like to be ‘dictated’ by the other Nation, howsoever close or critical friend it might be.

Much before PL480, in 1950 itself, India had made a formal request for 2 million tonnes of wheat to US. The US Congress was not in sympathy with Indian requests for various reasons, among others, Nehru’s propensity to pontificate, its closeness to China and its stand in Korea. The US Congress dragged its foot leading to an outburst from a feckless Nehru "We would be unworthy of the high responsibilities with which we have been charged if we bartered our country's self-respect or freedom of action, even for something we need badly." Needless to say, the US Congress was miffed. Mercifully, better sense prevailed and Nehru changed his tone after a few days. The grain arrived but Indians rather than thanking the US, resented its actions. In a marked contrast, a much smaller shipment from the USSR was thanked profusely.

When India could not stomach the US attempt to use aid as a lever of policy, just why do we think that Nepal would bear it with a grin?

It is be quite unfortunate that the Nepalese elite has refused to honour its commitments and share power with the Madhesis and Janjatis. Yet, just what locus standi does India have in this issue? We might share close relations with the Madhesis but they are not Indians. Both the hill and plain Nepalese will need to learn how to co-exist. A partisan India will not carry any credibility and will make life only tough for those it professes to sympathise with. Over 40 years back, India intervened in Sri Lanka to protect its Tamil minority. Certainly, the persecution of Tamilians was harsh, in many ways, reflective of a genocidal mindset of the majority Sinhalese. But did Indian intervention benefit either the Tamilians or India in any way? Tamilians today are a smaller and a more scattered minority and India is not seen as a trusted friend by any of the parties in Sri Lanka.

With the Madhesis, the situation is much better in the sense that though discriminated against, they are not persecuted. While discrimination itself is an anathema, are anti-hill feelings so strong that the Madhesi-Janjati would demand a separate state? And if they do demand, can India really afford to support them?

No. It cannot. It should not and it will not.

By its overt and covert act of rejecting Nepalese constitution, India has only made the Madhesi appear even more as a fifth column for India, something which will only harm Nepalese integration. Just how can a democratic nation ignore the fact that in the previous elections, the Madhesi parties were routed and that the current constitution was passed by over 90% of Nepalese lawmakers? If it believes that absence of Madhesi parties invalidate the constitution, it is dangerously parroting the Muslim League and secularist formulae that only a Muslim can speak for a Muslim or a only a Dalit can speak for a Dalit.

While there can be no doubt that the current Indo-Nepalese stalemate is a glaring failure of Indian diplomacy, it is sad that the Indian opposition, rather than offering sage counsel, is rubbing its hands in glee.

Many commentators are now outrageously claiming that the Nepalese were unhappy with Indian demands that Nepal revert to being a Hindu Nation. Can those worthies provide even a single piece of evidence to back such claim? It was in fact, the Nepalese public which had forced their politicians to consider such an act. Something which was considered a given till September 7 quite mysteriously did not happen, much to the dismay of vast majority of Nepalese. It will not be an unreasonable conjecture that the same Mani Shankar Aiyyar, now berating Modi for interfering in Nepal would have berated Nepal, if horror of horrors, it had become Hindu again!

With bombastic statements from Indian journalists quite common (they are of course secure in the knowledge that anyone attempting to point out their falsehoods would be dismissed as a troll, an Internet Hindu or a Sanghi), many have claimed that the current crisis is the worst ever in Indo-Nepalese relations.

One can only admire their brazenness in ignoring the Rajiv Gandhi dictated economic blockade which ostensibly was on account of Nepalese buying cheaper Chinese arms though the Nepalese versions claim that the blockade happened on account of King Birendra declining Mr Gandhi’s breakfast invite and more because of the Nepalese barring his Christian spouse from visiting the Pashupatinath temple!

Very clearly, we have learnt nothing from our past misadventures.

In these times, let us please remember the pragmatism of Mrs. Gandhi in face of US’s adventurism on PL480. Like the Indian elite then, the Nepalese elite now will not be troubled by Indian economic blockade. It will be the millions of poor Nepalese, with who we share a common religion, a common culture, a common heritage and above all, common ideals of human existence, who will be harmed.

Let better sense prevail!

Thursday, April 30, 2015

A Review of Vir Sanghvi's Mandate: Will of the People

Have just completed ‘Mandate: Will of the People’ by Vir Sanghvi. Recommended by a friend as an interesting read on Indian Elections, it had a very flattering Foreword penned by Amish Tripathi. We all know that Vir writes well, is a Delhi insider (remember Radia tapes) and is a tenured journalist and a food hack. Encouraged enough, I managed to complete this 137 page, large-spaced, large-lettered booklet in one sitting.

The book professes to be an ‘easy-to-read’ book on India’s recent political history, focused on events leading to General Elections 1971 onwards and their impact on the Nation. In his introduction, Vir mentions the huge efforts (months of research and travel and the intense efforts put in to collate and synthesize data) that had gone in to prepare for his TV show and its offshoot, this book.

I have not watched the TV show and hence cannot comment on it. But as far as the book is concerned, it is difficult to visualize if this weakly written, typo-ridden, error-prone and superficial book actually required that much of an effort to compose. There is hardly any revelation or insight in the book which any regular observer of Indian politics would not be aware of. Since Vir makes it very clear that this is a book on events the way ‘he-saw-it’ and does not adopt a non-biased tone, it is excusable if he pushes a particular Point of View. Yet, ignoring important events and personalities only leads to the reader getting a half-picture which is probably as dangerous as the reader remaining ignorant. Inexcusable though are the factual errors which can jar sensibilities of any informed reader.

Vir states (Pg 55) that the 1984 General Elections resulted in the biggest majority ever in India with the Congress winning 50.7% of the votes and 416 seats. However, as per the Election Commission of India, the Congress had won only 404 seats and 49.1% of votes. Even if the data from delayed elections in Punjab and Assam get added, the Congress won 10 more seats, a total of 414. But, with a vote share of 32.14% in these 2 states, the overall vote share of the party comes down to 48.12%, a far cry from the claimed 50.7%. Fact remains, no party has won over 50% of votes in any parliamentary election in India yet.

While Vir’s absurd statement on Hindus ‘destroying’ Buddhist temples can be dismissed as a manifestation of his ‘secular’ sensibilities, it is difficult to agree when he claims that the agitation for liberation of Ram Janmabhoomi gained traction because of the Shah Bano judgement. People with longer memories will remember that the agitation had started taking roots 1983 onwards and its gaining steam in the late 80s had much to do with the very nature of campaign strategy designed by the VHP and assorted seers.

What is striking about Vir’s analysis of 1989 elections is the complete whitewash of the BJP’s alliance with the Janata Dal, the various complexities of this arrangement and the BJP’s spectacular ascendance.

Still, Vir’s analysis of 1989 elections seems sparkling when compared to his take on 1991 elections. Vir claims that Rajiv Gandhi was drawing adulating masses and was set for a comeback. Was it so? Election coverage reports from those days do speak of hysterical masses, but in the public meetings and rallies of BJP leaders. Vir conveniently ignores the fact that a few phases of 1991 elections were postponed by 3 weeks in the aftermath of Rajiv Gandhi’s killings and that a sympathy wave buoyed up Congress’s performance in the remaining phases. Even a cursory analysis of results within the same state (Madhya Pradesh for example) would show that the Congress gained heavily in the second round of polls. 

Counter-intuitive is his take on the events leading to 1991 elections. Vir professes that VP Singh would have won elections had they been held immediately after he had lost the confidence vote. This is nothing but wild speculation without any basis for National sentiments at that time seemed heavily tilted in favor of the BJP, driven to a large extent by Lalu’s act of stopping LK Advani from completing his yatra. Anyway, the elections which could have happened in Dec-Jan happened in May-June, not that many months later. The Janata Dal slipped badly and the Backwards (at least the non-Yadavs) who would have supported JD (as per Vir) ended up supporting the BJP in large numbers.

Another set of curious assertions which Vir makes are around Chandrashekhar's ascendancy to Prime Ministership. Vir rightly states that Chandrashekhar was expecting the PM's post in 1989. Yet, Vir's narration of the late leader's acceptance of Congress's support seems to paint a picture of his sacrifice rather than fulfillment of his life-long dream. Whitewashed are the events leading upto Chandrashekhar's resignation. While Vir does mention the widely held theory that the cause of Congress's withdrawal of support was it's fear that the then PM was close to resolving the Ayodhya dispute, Vir completely ignores the fracas over alleged surveillance on Rajiv, ostensibly being conducted on the PM's order. While the actual event may have been as significant as Delhi police asking for Rahul Gandhi's shoe size, it was this allegation which resulted in cutting short of Chandrashekhar's tenure as the Prime Minister.

Yet another example of Vir’s ‘secular’ sensibilities is his claim that in 1996 elections, Atal Bihari Vajpayee had ‘reclaimed’ BJP’s leadership from LK Advani. Well, history records that Advani had suo motu declared Vajpayee as BJP’s PM candidate in 1995, much before he was implicated in the Hawala scam. How can a person be said to have ‘reclaimed’ what was actually ‘handed over’ to him?

Then comes another blooper. Vir claims that Atal Bihari Vajpayee was the star of 1997 election campaign! How could that be when elections were held in 1998 and not 1997?

Anyway, the treatment of Jayalalitha’s withdrawal of support of the parliamentary confidence vote is callous. No mention of the infamous tea party where Jaya and Sonia came together, no mention of the role played by Subramanian Swamy (then stoutly against anything remotely associated with the RSS) and again, no mention of theatrics involving Giridhar Gomango and even of Saifuddin Soz. That single vote which brought down Vajpayee can be attributed to any of the 3 (Mayawati and the abovementioned).

Vir gets his seat count wrong again when he attributes the NDA as having won 296 seats in the 1999 elections. Accounting for the Telugu Desam, the NDA had 304 seats. 

As for the analysis of 2004 polls, it is passable but for the inordinate focus on India Shining. No doubt that India Shining was a horrendous campaign but it was not the only reason for BJP’s defeat. BJP’s arrogance, the depletion of its alliance and antipathy / sullen indifference of its core support group played at least an equal, if not more important role in the BJP’s well deserved defeat. 

That apart, the crowning glory (Pg 122) amongst all the ridiculous assertions made in the book reads thus: ‘…the seeds for the fall of the UPA were sown in the very first years of the Government’. Now, in the Indian democratic setup, any Government (barring J&K) has a term of 5 years. Here, the UPA not only completed its tenure of 5 years, it got re-elected and ruled for a full 5 years again. So, just how can it be said that the so-called seeds of the Government’s fall in 2014 were sown in 2004?

Vir’s analysis of 2009 elections is good enough except for his laughable contention (Pg 131) that the BJP was projected to win these elections. No credible poll at any point of time (except those which Vir seems to have smoked up) projected this possibility. All polls at all times predicted the return of the UPA though with an improved performance from the NDA. And how could any poll have predicted any scenario otherwise when the BJP had lost even more allies and Advani’s Prime Minister candidature (with his now iconic karate chop image staring from hoardings) even more uninspiring than that of Manmohan Singh? Vir ignores the role played by Rahul Gandhi in those polls. Public memory is short and given the ridicule surrounding Rahul Gandhi of 2014, it is difficult now to visualize that the same Rahul Gandhi was looked upon as a beacon of hope by vast sections of rural populace and at least in states like Uttar Pradesh, his campaign had had a direct positive impact on the Congress’s performance.

The closing chapter on Elections 2014 is good but lacks any worthwhile comment on what made Narendra Modi the phenomenon that he became. 

The book is not without merits though. It is a light read, something you could pick up for a short flight or while waiting at the Doctor’s reception and still manages to provide a good deal of information for the unaware. What stands out is the author’s personal recollection of the 1971 election campaign when Indira Gandhi’s pro-poor stance drew mass hysteria. What is particularly good is the author’s take on Punjab terrorism and his articulation of the anti-Hindu stance of radical Sikhs and the killings they had unleashed. Vir does good service to history when he highlights the role played by a systematic media campaign in influencing public mood in 1984. Good again are his portraits of some personalities like that of VP Singh. The high point though are some bitchy comments like: ‘But Manmohan Singh had his admirers. Most people who did not know him well regarded him as a humble, decent apolitical figure…..’, which say much more than what entire paras would. 

Overall, an underwhelming book.

Sorry Amish. Loved your Shiva trilogy. But you are way off mark when assessing Vir Sanghvi’s ‘effort’.